































The JENA ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS is a joint publication of the Friedrich 
Schiller University and the Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany. 




Friedrich Schiller University Jena  Max Planck Institute of Economics 
Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3  Kahlaische Str. 10 
D-07743 Jena  D-07745 Jena 
www.uni-jena.de   www.econ.mpg.de 
 
© by the author. 
 
 
 Testing the Modigliani-Miller theorem directly in the lab
M. Vittoria Levati∗ Jianying Qiu† Prashanth Mahagaonkar‡
Abstract
We present an experiment designed to test the Modigliani-Miller theorem. Ap-
plying a general equilibrium approach and not allowing for arbitrage among ﬁrms
with diﬀerent capital structures, we ﬁnd that, in accordance with the theorem, partic-
ipants well recognize changes in the systematic risk of equity associated with increasing
leverage and, accordingly, demand higher rate of return. Yet, this adjustment is not
perfect: subjects underestimate the systematic risk of low-leveraged equity whereas
they overestimate the systematic risk of high-leveraged equity, resulting in a U-shaped
cost of capital. A (control) individual decision-making experiment, eliciting several
points on individual demand and supply curves for shares, provides some support for
the theorem.
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Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrate that in a perfect capital market1 the value of a
ﬁrm is independent of how that ﬁrm is ﬁnanced. Since its appearance this theorem (now
known as the Modigliani-Miller or MM theorem) has been an object of lively debates and
extensive empirical analyses. The original article itself includes a section devoted to testing
the propositions on oil and electricity utility industries. The results show that there is
little evidence of a relationship between leverage and the cost of capital. In a follow-up
study, Miller and Modigliani (1966) adopt a two-stage instrumental variable procedure to
estimate the cost of capital for a sample of large US electric utilities for the years 1954,
1956, and 1957. They ﬁnd no evidence for “sizable leverage or dividend eﬀects of the kind
assumed in much of the traditional literature of ﬁnance”.
The opposition to the MM theorem comes from many angles. Weston (1963) tests the theo-
rem using the same sample of electricity utility industries as used by Modigliani and Miller
(1958), but for the year 1959 rather than for the years 1947 and 1948. His multiple re-
gression analysis indicates that leverage does have an inﬂuence on a ﬁrm’s cost of capital
when earnings growth is taken into account. Robichek et al. (1967) extend the analysis of
Miller and Modigliani (1966) to the years 1955 and 1958–64. They conclude that MM’s
results are a consequence of circumstances prevailing at the time of their study. Davenport
(1971) uses data on three industry groups (chemicals, food, and metal manufacturing),
and his results are indicative of a U-shaped cost of capital with respect to leverage. Other
empirical studies suggesting that a ﬁrm’s value changes signiﬁcantly in response to changes
in the capital structure include Masulis (1980), Dann (1981), Masulis and Korwar (1986),
Pinegar and Lease (1986), Graham and Harvey (2001), and Arzac and Glosten (2005).
These studies and, generally, most of the works rejecting the MM theorem rely on some
kind of market imperfections. However, no study so far has tried to focus on the more
fundamental question: could the violation of the MM theorem be inherent in the valuation
process?
A clean and conclusive test of the above fundamental question using real market data is
virtually impossible. Not only the restrictions and assumptions that the theorem demands
may not be fulﬁlled in the real world, but also the ceteris paribus conditions, necessary
to explore the impact of the debt-equity ratio on the ﬁrm’s value in isolation, are often
violated. Hence, an apparent signiﬁcant correlation between leverage and cost of capital
may be accounted for by the presence of imperfections such as taxes or transactions costs.
1 That is, a market where there are no taxes, transactions costs, or asymmetric information, and
investors and ﬁrms are price takers.
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ratio may be due to a relationship between leverage and other factors inﬂuencing the cost
of capital, e.g., earnings growth may oﬀset the eﬀect of leverage on the cost of capital
(see e.g. Weston, 1963). Myers (2001, p. 86) rightly admits that the MM theorem “is ex-
ceptionally diﬃcult to test directly”. Unambiguous experimental evidence of the theorem
seems therefore much-needed before we can be conﬁdent about the impact of the capital
structure on the ﬁrm’s value.
Motivated by these considerations, in this paper we test the MM theorem directly in a
competitive market experiment. Creating a laboratory environment as close as possible to
the theoretical model, we want to assess whether subjects’ valuations of ﬁrms that generate
the same income stream vary with the capital structure. The model we use is adapted
from that of Stiglitz (1969). Using a general equilibrium approach, we prove rigorously
that if individuals can borrow at the same market rate of interest as ﬁrms and there is no
bankruptcy, the MM theorem always holds in equilibrium, and this result does not depend
on individuals’ risk attitudes and initial wealth positions. To test a key assumption of our
model, we also run a (control) individual decision-making experiment.
Details about the MM theorem and our adaptation of Stiglitz’s (1969) model are presented
in Section 2, after discussing the U-shaped cost of capital approach. The experimental
design is laid out in Section 3. The results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theories of the cost of capital
Before 1958 the cost of capital was thought to possess a U shape. The argument runs as
follows. Since equity is more risky (and thus more costly) than debt,2 a ﬁrm can reduce
its cost of capital by issuing debt in exchange for equity. As the debt-equity ratio of the
leveraged ﬁrm increases further, default risk becomes larger and, after some point, debt
becomes more expensive than equity.
To clarify the issue, consider a ﬁrm with market value of bonds B and market value of
equity or shares S, so that V ≡ B + S is the market value of the ﬁrm. Denote by  = B
V
the leverage ratio, by i the expected rate of return on equity, and by r the rate of return
2 A ﬁrm promises to make contractual payments whatever its earnings. Thus, when there is no
bankruptcy, there is no risk. When there is a positive probability of bankruptcy, debt is still the less
risky option because it has priority over equity in payment.
2








= (1 − ) · i +  · r:
Two conditions are required for (1) to be U-shaped. First, r must be a function of ;
more speciﬁcally, r < i when  is small and r > i when  exceeds a threshold. Second, i
must be independent of . As we will show below, the latter requirement does not hold if
investors are risk averse.
Consider the following numerical example. In time 1 (before interest payment), a ﬁrm
generates income ˜ X which can be either 200 or 60, with equal probabilities. The ﬁrm’s
expected value is therefore ¯ X = 130. Suppose ﬁrst that the ﬁrm is entirely ﬁnanced with
equity, and V = S = 100. Then the rate of return on equity has the following structure:
Rate of return on equity Prob.
2:0 0:5
0:6 0:5;
and the expected rate of return on equity (i) is 1.3. Suppose now that the ﬁrm issues
bonds (B′) worth 50 at an interest rate (r) of 1.1. By assumption i remains unchanged,
implying that
200 − 50 × 1:1
S′ 0:5 +
60 − 50 × 1:1
S′ 0:5 = 1:3; (2)
where S′ is the new value of equity. Solving (2) for S′ yields S′ ≈ 58, so that the new
market value of the ﬁrm is V ′ = B′ + S′ ≈ 108. The rate of return on equity is now:
Rate of return on equity Prob.
2:5 0:5
0:1 0:5:
Hence investors ask for the same rate of return for an income ﬂow with higher risk. As
suggested by standard ﬁnancial theory, this cannot happen if investors are risk averse.
The above example has already revealed the intuition of the MM theorem. Recognizing the
relationship between  and i, Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) Proposition I asserts that the
market value of any ﬁrm is independent of its capital structure and is given by capitalizing
its expected return at some rate  appropriate to its risk level.
3
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Several approaches may be taken to examine the MM theorem. In this paper, we shall
ask experimental subjects to evaluate the equity of ﬁrms with diﬀerent capital structures
separately over diﬀerent markets. In other words, we place each ﬁrm in a separate market,
thereby excluding arbitrage among the ﬁrms.
Arbitrage plays an important role in Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) analysis for it helps
to restore the stated equalities if Proposition I is violated. However, arbitrage is not
necessary for the theorem to hold (see, e.g., Hirshleifer, 1966; Stiglitz, 1969). Additionally,
allowing for arbitrage among ﬁrms may conceal the existence of preferences for ﬁrms with a
particular capital structure because a few arbitrageurs could help eliminate this ‘anomaly’
at the market level. After all, as shown by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), arbitrage can never
be complete in real ﬁnancial markets. By excluding arbitrage among ﬁrms we can address
a question of fundamental importance to the valuation of ﬁrms: Do subjects systematically
evaluate ﬁrms with diﬀerent capital structures diﬀerently? If so, how?
There is an additional strength in proceeding this way. Some empirical studies show that
ﬁrms with diﬀerent capital structures are evaluated similarly. Yet, this does not necessarily
imply the irrelevance of capital structure to the value of the ﬁrm. The same result could be
obtained if investors, in general, preferred some capital structure ∗ to some other capital
structure ′, but these preferences were recognized by the ﬁrms that adjusted their capital
structure towards ∗. In this case, ﬁrms would be evaluated similarly simply because their
capital structure is concentrated on ∗. Our approach allows us to explore this possibility.
Note, however, that the exclusion of arbitrage may cause a potential problem. Since the
law of one price can not be applied,3 the investors’ personal traits (like risk attitudes
or wealth levels) become relevant and can aﬀect results. For example, the valuation of
diﬀerent risky shares may diﬀer depending on the portfolio that investors hold. Yet, this
diﬀerence in valuations does not reﬂect the diﬀerence in shares per se, but it relates to the
composition of the investors’ portfolio. Since we want to focus on the valuation process per
se, we need to minimize the impact of the participants’ own traits. For this purpose, we
adopt Stiglitz’s (1969) general equilibrium model. In this model the MM theorem holds
regardless of the participants’ initial wealth conditions. Furthermore, the equilibrium
solution is derived from the state-preference approach (Hirshleifer, 1966) which, compared
to the more familiar mean-variance approach, does not make strong assumptions about risk
attitudes or utility function shapes. Hence the results hold under more general conditions.
3 The law of one price states that in an eﬃcient market all identical goods must have only one price.
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Consider an economy with one ﬁrm and a set N of individual investors. The ﬁrm operates
for two periods: t0 (present) and t1 (future). The uncertain income stream ˜ X generated
by the ﬁrm at t1 is a function of the future state of the world . Let ˜ X() denote the
ﬁrm’s income in state . Each investor j ∈ N is endowed with an initial wealth !j, which
is composed of a fraction j of S (the ﬁrm’s equity) and Bj units of bonds. Since the







where B stands as before for the market value of the ﬁrm’s bonds. By convention, one
unit of bond costs one unit of money. Thus, investor j’s budget constraint (∀j ∈ N) is
!j = jS + Bj: (3)
In addition, there exists a credit market where both the ﬁrm and the investors can borrow
and lend at the rate of interest r. To be consistent with the assumptions of MM theo-
rem, we suppose that the ﬁrm never goes bankrupt. Investors prefer more to less, and
evaluate alternative portfolios in terms of the income stream they generate, i.e., investors’
preferences are not state dependent.
2.2.1 The benchmark solution
In this section we shall prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (1) If there exists a general equilibrium with a fully-equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm
having a particular value, then there exists another general equilibrium solution for the
economy with the ﬁrm having any other capital structure but with its value unchanged.
(2) Moreover, the property that the ﬁrm’s value is unchanged holds in any equilibrium.4
Let us now consider two economies. The ﬁrm in the ﬁrst economy is only ﬁnanced by
equity. The ﬁrm in the second economy is ﬁnanced by both equity and bonds. Let V1
and V2 denote the value of the ﬁrm in the ﬁrst and second economy, respectively. We ﬁrst
show that there exists a general equilibrium solution with V2 = V1.
4 Stiglitz (1969) only proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition. We complete the proof by demonstrating
the second part.
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1 = 0. Here a positive
(negative) value of B
j
1 would mean that investor j invests (borrows) B
j
1 units of money in
(from) the credit market. Let Y
j
1 () stand for investor j’s income in state  of economy
1. With a portfolio consisting of j shares of the ﬁrm and B
j
1 units of bonds, investor j’s
return in state  can be written as:
Y
j
1 () = j ˜ X() + rB
j
1 (4)
= j ˜ X() + r(!j − jV1);
which follows from (3) and S1 = V1.
Turn now to the second economy where the ﬁrm issues bonds with a market value of B2.




2 = B2. Notice that the ﬁrm generates the same pattern of income stream ˜ X.
With a portfolio consisting of j shares of the ﬁrm and B
j
2 units of bonds, investor j’s
return in state  is then given by:
Y
j
2 () = j( ˜ X() − rB2) + rB
j
2 (5)
= j( ˜ X() − rB2) + r(!j − jS2)
= j ˜ X() + r(!j − jV2);
where the third equality follows from S2 = V2 − B2.
If V1 = V2 = V ∗, the opportunity sets described by (4) and (5) are identical, i.e.:
Y
j
1 () = Y
j
2 () ∀ and ∀j: (6)
Thus, if j maximizes individual j’s utility in the ﬁrst economy, it still does in the second
economy. This proves the ﬁrst part of Proposition 1. It remains to show that V1 = V2 = V ∗
holds in any equilibrium. when agents are strictly risk averse.
Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in the second economy where V ′
2 > V1 = V ∗.
This in turn implies S′
2 = V ′
2 − B2 > V ∗ − B2 = S∗
2. As the rate of return on equity is
~ X−rB
S , with ˜ X and B unchanged, the increase in the ﬁrm’s equity value (from S∗
2 to S′
2)
yields a decrease in the rate of return on equity. Such a decrease discourages the demand
for equity in the second economy. Since the equity market of the second economy clears
at S∗
2 = V ∗ − B2, it follows that there will be oversupply of equity when S′
2 > S∗
2. But
this is in contradiction with the assumption that V ′
2 > V ∗ is an equilibrium. The other
6
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2 < V ∗ can be proved similarly.
Two features of the above model are worth noticing. First, no assumptions are made
about investors’ initial wealth. This is particularly helpful when conducting laboratory
experiments because it reduces eﬀects of sample selection on results. Second, except for
the basic assumption that investors prefer more to less, no strong assumptions are made
with respect to the shape of the utility function. This is also very appealing as measuring
risk attitudes is tricky and not always accurate. Therefore, we expect experimental results
based upon the above model to hold in fairly broad circumstances.
3 Experimental protocol
The computerized experiment was conducted in September 2007. Overall, we ran 3 sessions
with a total of 78 participants, all being students at the Friedrich-Schiller University of
Jena (Germany). The ﬁrst session (with 14 participants) was conducted in the video lab
of the Max Planck Institute of Economics. In this session, two subjects were put into one
cubicle and acted as one agent.5 We explicitly asked the participants to discuss loudly
their strategy so that both their discussion and their game play could be recorded. The
other two sessions (with 32 participants each) were run in the computer lab of the Max
Planck Institute of Economics. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Considering the complexity of the experimental procedures, only students with
relatively high analytical skills were invited, i.e., students majoring in subjects such as
mathematics, physics, engineering, economics, and business administration. Participants
earned on average e15.90, inclusive of a e2.50 show-up fee.
3.1 General environments and procedures
Each experimental session consists of two subsequent phases. In the ﬁrst phase, the lottery
choice procedure developed by Holt and Laury (2002) is used to measure participants’ risk
attitudes.6 Subjects are shown ten pairwise comparisons. In each comparison they are
asked to choose between a safe option Y and a risky option X (see the instructions in the
supplement for a complete representation of the ten comparisons). The payoﬀ for option
5 As only 14 subjects showed up, in two cubicles we had only one student.
6 While there is currently no agreement about how to best assess risk preferences, the Holt and Laury
procedure oﬀers several advantages, among which its easy applicability. Additionally, no systematic bias
has been found with respect to alternative methods of measuring risk (see Harrison and Rutstr¨ om, 2008).
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p or 30 ECU with probability (1 − p). In each successive comparison, p increases by
10 percentage points, until ﬁnally the last decision involves no uncertainty. Subjects’
choices (in particular, the comparison at which they switch from Y to X) reveal their risk
preferences.8 At the end of the phase, one of the ten comparisons is randomly selected to
determine the payoﬀ based upon the chosen option. In order not to eﬀect choices in the
following phase, feedback on individual earnings in the ﬁrst phase is given only at the end
of the session (i.e., on completion of the second phase).
The second phase is devoted to testing the model outlined in Section 2.2. Participants
are matched in groups of 8 (i.e., N = 8) and asked to evaluate eight ﬁrms in eight suc-
cessive treatments via a market mechanism to be explained shortly (in the experiment,
treatments are referred to as rounds). Group composition does not change throughout the
phase.9 Having one ﬁrm per treatment renders valuations independent from each other.
To further discourage (potential) portfolio eﬀects, only one treatment is randomly selected
for payment at the end of the experiment.
Denote a treatment by T and the ﬁrm in the T-th treatment by fT. Each fT is represented
by a risky asset that generates income stream
˜ X() =
{
1200 ECU if  = good
800 ECU if  = bad:
Since our experimental design is rather complex (especially, the implemented market mech-
anism requires some cognitive eﬀort), there is a need to minimize the impact of nuisance
variables like fatigue, boredom, alertness, and computational skills. For this reason, we
impose Prob( = good) = Prob( = bad) = 1
2. Equally likely outcomes are often encoun-
tered in practice and easy for subjects to understand. Additionally, some researchers argue
that in the case of equally likely outcomes, probabilities are less subjectively weighted,
i.e., they are less distorted (e.g., Quiggin, 1982; Viscusi, 1989), and − even if they are
distorted − this distortion does not aﬀect preferences (Levy and Levy, 2002).
Each ﬁrm fT has 100 shares outstanding and a market value of bonds BT, so that ﬁrms
diﬀer only in their value of BT. Since there is no bankruptcy, bonds are perfectly safe:
one unit of experimental money invested in bonds yields a gross return of 1.5, implying a
net risk-free interest rate of 0.5. Participants know that they can borrow any amount of
7 ECU is the experimental currency unit. Participants are informed that 10 ECU equal 1 euro.
8 Consistent subjects should only switch once from Y to X, and never back from X to Y .
9 We have, therefore, one group in the the video lab session and four groups in each of the two computer
lab sessions, yielding a total of nine groups.
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chosen for characterizing the ﬁrms in the eight treatments is:
T : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
BT : 50 ⇒ 350 ⇒ 100 ⇒ 0 ⇒ 400 ⇒ 200 ⇒ 500 ⇒ 300:
The ﬁrst two treatments (T = 1;2) are for training purposes. Their sole aim is to famil-
iarize the participants with the decision process and its incentives (they cannot be drawn
for payment).
We preferred not to present subjects with the complete capital structure of each ﬁrm
(income ﬂow and bonds’ market value). Instead, we give subjects the eight equities (that
is, the resulting return structure after payment of the interest on the bonds: ˜ X − 1:5BT)
and ask them to evaluate each equity. Thus, the participants are confronted with the




























































A ﬁrst reason for presenting each ﬁrm’s equity as a 50/50 gamble is that some students
(especially the economists) may have learned the MM theorem. Knowledge of the complete
capital structure may induce them to be consistent with the theorem, thereby biasing the
results. A second important reason is that such a presentation is very simple and allows us
to eﬀectively focus on the impact of diﬀerent capital structures on the valuation of ﬁrms,
minimizing any other confounding factor. If, in contradiction to MM theorem, ﬁrms with
diﬀerent capital structures are evaluated diﬀerently, this pattern should emerge also when
people are shown simple 50/50 gambles. To put it diﬀerently, if the theorem is violated
in a complex environment, it is unclear whether the violation is due to the complexity of
the task or is genuine in nature. On the other hand, if the MM theorem is not supported
even in a simple setting like ours, we can more safely presume that there is something
inherently wrong with the model.
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the MM theorem is to be expected.10 Yet, despite our eﬀorts to simplify the task, behaving
in accordance with the theorem involves evaluating the various risky alternatives in a way
that is not immediately straightforward. For example, subjects might not recognize the
increase of systematic risk in equity until the leverage ratio reaches a certain threshold. In
Davenport (1971), it is observed that there are substantial cost advantages to be gained
by increasing leverage up to a certain range, and that there is also strong evidence that
beyond a certain point further increases in the leverage ratio will lead to increases in the
over-all cost of capital.
The speciﬁc procedures in each treatment T (= 1;:::;8) are as follows.
1. Subjects are presented with one of the risky alternatives shown in (7). This alter-
native corresponds to ﬁrm fT’s return on equity. In addition, each subject receives
some initial endowment of the risky alternative and experimental money.11
2. A market mechanism becomes available. Via this mechanism subjects in each group
can trade the risky alternative with each other. Traded quantities are required to be
integers, and short selling is not allowed. Buying and selling prices must be within
the range [(800−1:5×BT)=(100×1:5); (1200−1:5×BT)=100].12
3. After some time the market closes, and the net change in each agent’s endowment
of the risky alternative is considered. If the change is positive, for each purchased
unit the agent pays a per-unit price equal to the market-clearing price; this amount
is automatically deducted from the ECU he owns. If the change is negative, for
each sold unit the agent receives a per-unit price equal to the market-clearing price;
the received amount is automatically deposited in a bank and earns a net risk-free
interest rate of 0.5.
4. Subjects are informed about (a) the market clearing price, and (b) their own ﬁnal
holdings of risky alternative and ECU.
To decrease income or wealth eﬀects, information about the realized state of the world is
given only at the end of the phase.13 To provide subjects with strong marginal incentive
and to increase the cost of mistakes, we pay subjects only the net proﬁts they make.
At the end of the phase, each participant gets feedback on (a) the state of the world which
10 For instance, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2010) show that when all liabilities are correctly priced, the
MM irrelevance result applies to banks’ organizational structure.
11 How endowments are distributed among group members is described in the next section.
12 Notice that the upper bound of the interval allows for non-rational behavior (as a further check on
subjects’ understanding of the situation).
13 We provide this information at the end of T = 1;2 (the two training treatments) to foster learning of
the incentives.
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randomly chosen for payment, and (d) his own ﬁnal payoﬀ.
3.2 Initial endowments and trading mechanism
The determination of the subjects’ initial endowments is important, especially when sub-
jects’ payments are based on the net proﬁts they make. Since the theoretical model sug-
gests that agents’ endowments in the diﬀerent treatments should be the same (cf., Eq. (3)),
a natural choice is to endow the participants with some amount of experimental money.
However, in a general equilibrium model, this would require knowing the value of the ﬁrm
a priori, i.e., before the experiment.
Taking into account the above considerations, in each treatment T initial endowments are
as follows. Four out of the eight group members receive 12 units of T’s risky alternative
(i.e., 12% of ﬁrm fT’s 100 shares) and an amount of ECU equal to 12% of BT; the remaining
four group members receive 13 units of T’s risky alternative and an amount of ECU equal
to 13% of BT. Subjects’ ECU are automatically deposited into a bank. For each ECU
deposited (borrowed), the bank oﬀers (charges) a net risk-free interest rate of 0.5.
Although the theoretical model is silent about the market trading mechanism, the exper-
imental choice of it is very important. Since we are interested in equilibrium outcomes,
the trading mechanism should allow for suﬃcient learning and convergence. Moreover, it
should be able to eﬀectively aggregate private information (e.g., one’s own valuation of
the alternatives), and to minimize the impact of individual mistakes on market prices.
In security markets, the daily opening price of a stock is especially diﬃcult to deter-
mine because of the high uncertainty associated with the stock’s fundamental value after
the overnight non-trading period. To set a reliable opening price, most major stock ex-
changes (e.g., New York, London, Frankfurt, Paris) use a call auction to open markets.
Economides and Schwartz (1995) show that, by gathering many orders together, the call
auction can facilitate order entry, reduce volatility, and enhance price discovery. These
features make the call auction a perfect candidate for our market experiment. An al-
ternative is the double-auction mechanism, which has quicker and more eﬃcient conver-
gence properties (see, e.g., Smith et al., 1982; Cason and Friedman, 1997; Kagel, 2004;
Cason and Friedman, 2008), but is slower to implement and quite time consuming.
In all eight treatments, the call auction operates as follows. The participants have 3
11
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alternative they want to buy or sell, and (b) the price at which they wish to trade each
unit. After the 3 minutes, aggregate demand and supply schedules are derived from the
individual orders. The market clearing (equilibrium) price is chosen to maximize volume
of trades. The algorithm used to compute the market clearing price is reproduced in
Appendix A.
To help subjects set a “reasonable” price and to increase learning, the 3 minutes are divided
into three trading periods, each lasting 1 minute.14 An “indicative” market clearing price
is computed and announced at the end of the ﬁrst two trading periods. This price is
indicative in the sense that it suggests the price at which all eligible trades would occur if
no orders were changed. Subjects know that they can revise their trade orders until the
end of the allotted three minutes.
3.3 A (control) individual decision-making experiment
Testing the MM theorem via the above trading mechanism can provide helpful insights
into how the market evaluates ﬁrms with diﬀerent capital structures. However, for the
model to hold, the markets must be always in equilibrium and, as remarked above, previous
experimental studies have cast doubt on the ability of call markets to produce convergence
to the competitive equilibrium quickly and eﬃciently (see Cason and Friedman, 1997,
2008, and references therein). Furthermore, even if the aggregate market outcome provides
support for the MM theorem, this does not necessarily imply that every agent is making
his utility-maximizing choice. Thus, following the suggestion of an anonymous referee,
as a check on the robustness of our results, we ran a fourth session where 32 subjects
participated in an individual decision-making experiment.
The session was conducted in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute. In
accordance with the market experiment, only subjects with relatively high analytical skill
were invited. Before starting the experiment, subjects had to answer three control ques-
tions. The session lasted about two hours including instructions and control questionnaire.
The average payment was e17.90.
This control experiment maintains several features of the market experiment. Subjects
play eight rounds, denoted once more by T. In each round T subjects are presented with
one of the risky alternatives given in (7), thereby facing a ﬁrm with a speciﬁc capital
14 To allow for suﬃcient learning, in each of the two training treatments the call auction opens for 6
minutes, and each trading period lasts 2 minutes.
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the other half of the subjects are endowed with 13 shares of ﬁrm fT and 13%×BT ECU.15
The experimental money is deposited into a bank, which pays a net interest rate of 0:5
for each ECU deposited. Similarly, subjects need to pay a net interest rate of 0:5 per
borrowed ECU.
In each round (and thus for a given capital structure and endowment), four points on each
subject’s supply and demand curves for shares are elicited, corresponding to quantities of
1, 5, 9, 12 or 13. Speciﬁcally, a subject who is endowed with 12 (13) shares is asked to
buy and sell 1, 5, 9, and 12 (13) units. In each round, the eight choices are elicited in a
random order so as to exclude ordering eﬀects.
As elicitation procedure we use the incentive-compatible Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mech-
anism (Becker et al., 1964). In the four ‘buy’ decisions, each subject is asked to report the
highest price WTP(x) (x = 1;5;9;12 or 13) at which he would be willing to buy each of
the x units, where WTP(x) ∈ [0:50;12]. In the four ‘sell’ decision, each subject is asked to
submit the minimum selling price WTA(x) per unit, where WTA(x) ∈ [0:50;12]. At the
end of each round, one of the eight decisions is randomly selected. A further draw from a
uniform distribution determines a random number  ∈ [0:50;12] and the selected decision
(either buy or sell) is executed depending on whether or not  exceeds the price speciﬁed
by the subject.16
4 Results on the individual decision-making experiment
In this section, we present the results of the control experiment where valuations are
deﬁned as reservation prices that a person is either willing to pay (WTP) to purchase x
units or willing to accept (WTA) to forgo x units. Table 1 provides average valuations,
separately for the type of trade, the eight bonds’ values, and the four traded quantities.
One thing which stands out immediately is that WTP is generally lower than WTA. The
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant not only when we average over all four traded quantities (p < 0:01,
paired Wilcoxon test), but also when we consider the four feasible quantities separately
(p < 0:05 for all four one-sided paired Wilcoxon tests). Additionally, the diﬀerence between
WTP and WTA is larger, the more units need to be traded (on average: −131:46 for x = 1;
15 Shares are referred to as units of the risky alternative in the instructions.
16 If the payoﬀ-relevant decision is a buy decision and WTP(x)  , the subject purchases the x units
at a unit price of . If the payoﬀ-relevant decision is a sell decision and WTA(x)  , the subject sells the
x units at a unit price of .
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buy and sell decisions
Bonds Buy decisions (WTP) Sell decisions (WTA)
value 1 unit 5 units 9 units 12,13 units 1 unit 5 units 9 units 12,13 units
0 775.19 657.53 640.41 640.22 848.81 842.91 861.06 815.19
50 765.03 609.16 560.62 575.81 883.16 825.91 852.41 916.72
100 687.22 648.06 606.34 624.28 825.31 867.44 814.25 825.72
200 734.81 609.25 580.62 499.59 814.06 840.69 847.25 878.41
300 684.09 618.75 539.22 541.12 915.31 839.56 885.16 905.78
350 727.03 639.41 654.12 595.69 875.69 848.84 855.97 867.94
400 661.88 687.69 621.69 543.94 831.25 824.00 851.12 879.81
500 726.94 657.75 555.47 515.88 820.25 836.50 878.53 839.59
ALL 720.27 640.95 594.81 567.07 851.73 840.73 855.72 866.14
−199:78 for x = 5; −260:91 for x = 9; −299:08 for x = 12;13).
Participants’ endowment of experimental money varies from round to round, and the ECU
at their disposal may aﬀect willingness to pay. It is therefore worthy to investigate whether
buy decisions vary with the ECU endowment. To this aim we compute, for each x and each
subject, the average WTP(x) separately for BT ≤ 200 and BT ≥ 300. Comparing the 32
individual average WTP(x) when BT ≤ 200 and when BT ≥ 300, it is not possible to reject
the null hypothesis that, for each x, the two series have identical distributions (p > 0:10
for all four traded quantities, two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank tests). This suggests that
subjects’ willingness to pay is not inﬂuenced by the size of the ECU endowment.
The utility maximization assumption in Proposition 1 (Equation 6) implies that if all
shares were owned by individuals identical to a certain subject, the value of the ﬁrm
resulting from the price reported for a given quantity should be the same across all capital
structures. That is, if we denote by Vf′(x) and Vf∗(x) the value of the ﬁrms with capital
structure, respectively, ′ and ∗ when x shares are traded, the proposition requires that
for each x: Vf′(x) = Vf∗(x) for all ′;∗ = 1;2;:::;8, and ′ ̸= ∗.
To test this assumption, for each x we compare − via a series of Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests − the observed valuations across the eight capital structures. For each x we therefore
perform 28 comparisons. With four traded quantities, we have 28 × 4 = 112 comparisons
for the buy decisions and 112 comparisons for the sell decisions. Using p < 0:05 as the
signiﬁcance level, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence is detected for 5:35% (6 out of 112) comparisons
in the buy decisions, and for 2:68% (3 out of 112) comparisons in the sell decisions.17
17 All signiﬁcant diﬀerences are observed when the subjects trade the maximum quantity of shares
(x = 12 or 13).
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Expl. Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error t-statistic p-value
 729:7523** 25.6347 28:4674 0.0000
BT −0:0681 0.1166 −0:5840 0.5593
B2
T 0:0001 0.0002 0:3405 0.7335
Trades 131:4570** 21.2012 6:2004 0.0000
x5 −79:3242** 21.2012 −3:7415 0.0002
x9 −125:4609** 21.2012 −5:9176 0.0000
x123 −153:2070** 21.2012 −7:2263 0.0000
Trades × x5 68:3242** 29.9830 2:2788 0.0228
Trades × x9 129:4492** 29.9830 4:3174 0.0000
Trades × x123 167:6211** 29.9830 5:5905 0.0000
Std. dev. of the random eﬀects u = 102:2934
Std. dev. of error term e = 239:8642
Number of observations 2048
** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Thus, overall, we do not ﬁnd strong evidence against the utility maximization assumption
implied by Proposition 1.
Finally, we run a linear regression with mixed eﬀects to explore carefully the impact of
bonds on the valuation of the ﬁrms. Explanatory variables are the intercept (), the
bonds’ value (BT), the square of the bonds’ value (B2
T), the dummy Trades (which equals
0 for the WTP and 1 for the WTA), the four traded quantities (x1, x5, x9, and x123),
and the interaction between traded quantity and type of trade. Random eﬀects are the
32 individual subjects. Formally, the model is as follows:
Vi =  + ui + 1 · BT + 2 · B2
T + 3 · Trades + 4 · x5 + 5 · x9
+6 · x123 + 7 · Trades · x5 + 8 · Trades · x9
+9 · Trades · x9 + 10 · Trades · x123 + "i;
where i ∈ {1;2;:::;32} denotes the 32 subjects, ui v N(0;2
u) denotes the random eﬀects
in the intercept for each subject, and "i v N(0;2
e). The results of the regression are
presented in Table 2.
The coeﬃcients of both BT and B2
T are not signiﬁcant, pointing to a consistency with the
MM theorem, i.e., bonds have no eﬀect on the valuation of ﬁrms. The remaining estimated
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Trades is positive and signiﬁcant); (b) the more units need to be traded, the lower the
WTP and the higher the WTA.
The above results are based on individual valuations of ﬁrms. In reality, the valuation of
ﬁrms is more a market outcome.18 We therefore turn to the analysis of the main market
experiment.
5 Results on the market experiment
Risk attitudes play an important role in markets. In fact, trade can occur only when
agents have heterogeneous risk preferences. In the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery choice
procedure − that we employed in the ﬁrst phase of the market experiment − the subjects’
total number of safe choices can be used as a proxy for risk aversion. Denote this proxy
by 
. Obviously, the larger the value of 
, the higher the degree of risk aversion. We
ﬁnd considerable variation across people and a median 
-value of 6, which suggests that
most participants are risk averse. Furthermore, all subjects are consistent, i.e., they have
a single switch point.19
According to standard portfolio theory, relatively risk averse individuals should hold a
greater portion of their wealth in safe deposits, whereas more risk tolerant individuals
should prefer higher-risk assets. In line with this assertion, we ﬁnd that the correla-
tion between 
 and subjects’ end-holdings of experimental money is signiﬁcantly positive
(Spearman’s  = 0:09, p < 0:01), and the correlation between 
 and subjects’ end-holdings
of the risky alternative is signiﬁcantly negative (Spearman’s  = −0:091, p < 0:05).
As noted above, given the complexity of our experiment, we invited only students with
relatively high analytical skills. Moreover, prior to the experiment, subjects had to answer
a control questionnaire testing their comprehension of the rules. We suspect, however, that
some subjects did not pick up all facets of the problem. First, during the administration
of the control questionnaire, a few people encountered diﬃculties in handling a gross
interest rate of 1.5. Second, in the post-experimental questionnaire, a number of subjects
explicitly complained about the diﬃculty of the task. It is then important to check that
the experimental results are reliable. To this aim we compare the values of the ﬁrms
18 With each subject’s demand and supply points in hand, we could create artiﬁcial markets and compute
the value of the ﬁrms from the market clearing price of these artiﬁcial markets. Yet, due to the huge
diﬀerence between WTP and WTA, no market clearing price existed in most artiﬁcial markets.
19 Such a consistency may be a consequence of the stringent selection criteria used for recruiting subjects.
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Figure 1: Empirical values of the ﬁrms across periods
implied by the experimental data with the theoretical value resulting from the assumption
of rational risk neutral agents.20
Since the risk-free gross interest rate was 1.5, a risky asset paying either 1200 or 800 with
equal probabilities should be valued at (1200×0:5+800×0:5)=1:5 = 667 by risk neutral rational
agents. Figure 1 displays the development of the ﬁrms’ empirical values across periods.
On the horizontal axis, three consecutive periods represent one treatment, i.e., periods 1–3
correspond to T = 1, periods 4–6 correspond to T = 2, etc. The circles denote the ﬁrms’
indicative values, calculated from the indicative market clearing prices determined at the
end of the ﬁrst two trading periods of each treatment. The triangles denote the ﬁrms’
ﬁnal values, calculated from the ﬁnal market clearing prices determined in the third and
last trading period of each treatment.
The median values of the ﬁrms are: 700 when all data points are used, 677:5 when the
indicative prices are excluded from the sample, and 667.5 when both indicative prices
and training periods are excluded. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests indicate that the central
tendency of each of the three empirical distributions does not diﬀer from 667 (lowest p-
20 The empirical value of a ﬁrm is obtained by adding the elicited market value of equity and the market
value of bonds.
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valuations are the result of individual decision making, reservation prices are far from 667
(see Table 2), and the diﬀerence between WTP and WTA does not allow for the existence
of a competitive equilibrium in most ‘artiﬁcial’ markets. The ﬁnding that the market
more closely matches rational choice theory is in line with past literature indicating that
exchange institutions “serve to push behavior more toward the Homo Economicus ﬁction
we assume in our models” (Shogren and Taylor, 2008, p. 34).21
We also observe that enough trading takes place at prices that are close to the mean of
the three market-clearing prices determined in each treatment. Call this mean ¯ P∗
T. On
average, in each treatment, groups buy 23.5 units and sell 26.83 units at prices falling in
the interval [ ¯ P∗
T − 2; ¯ P∗
T + 2]. Therefore, in spite of the complexity of the experimental
procedures and the diﬃculty of the task, subjects perform surprisingly well and the results
are reasonable.
Figure 1 shows that circles are more volatile than triangles, especially in the last treat-
ments. This is not surprising because the markets in the ﬁrst two trading periods are not
yet mature (subjects get more adept as time passes), and because the indicative prices
are not binding. Consequently, the following analysis shall consider only the ﬁnal market
clearing prices and the six payoﬀ-relevant treatments, unless otherwise stated.
A valid concern here, like in the (control) individual decision-making experiment, is that
subjects may have an aversion to borrow experimental money. Accordingly, the lower their
initial endowment of ECU, the less units of shares they would buy. This, of course, would
make the market values of the ﬁrms dependent on the people’s money endowment. In order
to test for this possibility, we perform an analysis similar to that in the previous section.
For each independent group, we calculate the average value of the ﬁrms when BT ≤ 200
(denoted by V B≤200), and the average value of the ﬁrms when BT ≥ 300 (denoted by
V B≥300). A two-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing the nine V B≤200-means with
the nine V B≥300-means does not reject the null hypothesis of equality of the two series
(p = 0:26). We can therefore conclude that subjects’ money endowment does not aﬀect
the ﬁrms’ value.
We conclude this subsection by noticing that not only Proposition 1 is the result of in-
dividual maximization, it also imposes a strong condition on individual portfolios. In
particular, the proposition implies that individuals’ holdings of equity should be the same
21 Chu and Chu (1990) show that the incidence of preference reversals is reduced in a market-like en-
vironment. Brocas and Carrillo (2001) ﬁnds that direct competition alleviates ineﬃciencies due to time
inconsistency.
18
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 021under the diﬀerent capital structures. An ANOVA analysis of individual shareholdings
across the diﬀerent capital structures cannot reject this hypothesis (p > 0:10).
5.1 The eﬀect of leverage on the cost of capital
We now turn to our main research question and examine the empirical relationship between
cost of capital and value of the ﬁrm derived from our data. As outlined in Section 2, there
are two main competing views on this relationship. The ﬁrst, the MM theorem, holds
that the value of the ﬁrm is independent of its capital structure. The second is that the
relationship is U-shaped: the weighted average cost of capital ﬁrst decreases with the value
of bonds and then increases. In the following, we shall compare these two views and see
which best organizes the data.
Figure 2 reports the average values of the ﬁrms as a function of the values of the bonds,
with average over the 9 independent groups. Since group heterogeneities may blur the
picture, the same relationship is presented in Figure 3 for the 9 groups separately. To
give a more general account of the data, both indicative values (circles) and ﬁnal values
(triangles) are illustrated. The continuous line in each panel of Figure 3 denotes the group
mean value of the ﬁrms, computed using only ﬁnal market clearing prices.
The MM theorem suggests that any increase in leverage leads to an increase in the sys-
tematic risk of equity, which in turn leads the shareholders to demand higher returns.
How well could subjects recognize changes in systematic risk due to changes in the capital
structure? To address this issue, we compute the correlation between the value of equity
and the value of bonds. Consistent with the MM theorem, we ﬁnd that this correlation is
negative and close to unity (Spearman’s  = −0:93, p < 0:01).
To examine the relationship between the value of the ﬁrm and the value of the bonds
more precisely, we run two linear mixed-eﬀects regressions. The ﬁrst regression models
the market values of the ﬁrms as a linear function of the value of the bonds (BT), the
square of the value of the bonds (B2
T), and period (t). Formally:
Vi =  + ui + 1 · BT + 2 · B2
T + 3 · t + "i; (8)
where i ∈ {1;2;:::;9} denotes the 9 independent groups, ui v N(0;2
u) denotes the
random eﬀects in the intercept for each group, and "i v N(0;2
e).
The results (presented in Table 3) reveal that the coeﬃcients of both BT and B2
T are
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Figure 2: Average values of the ﬁrms conditional on the market value of the bonds













































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Values of the ﬁrms conditional on the market value of the bonds, separately for
each of the 9 independent groups
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 021Table 3: Regression results on the market values of the ﬁrms
Expl. Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error t-statistic p-value
 677:4643** 30.6054 22:1354 0.0000
BT 0:6457** 0.1902 3:3956 0.0015
B2
T −0:0011** 0.0003 −3:2616 0.0022
t −4:2244* 2.1541 −1:9611 0.0565
Std. dev. of the random eﬀects u = 38:8864
Std. dev. of error term e = 58:0902
Number of observations 54
** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level. *Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Table 4: Regression results on the weighted average cost of capital
Expl. Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error t-statistic p-value
 1:5305∗∗ 0.0674 22:7151 0.0000
 −0:9702∗∗ 0.2453 −3:9546 0.0003
2 1:0941∗∗ 0.2642 4:1418 0.0002
t 0:0069 0.0047 1:4620 0.1512
Std. dev. of the random eﬀects u = 0:0886
Std. dev. of error term e = 0:1262
Number of observations 54
** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, their signs are indicative of a U-shaped cost of capital
curve. The coeﬃcient of t is weakly signiﬁcant, suggesting that some kind of learning is
taking place.
In the second regression, the dependent variable is the weighted average cost of capital
(WACC), calculated as the expected return of the ﬁrm (i.e., 1000) divided by the market
value of the ﬁrm. Independent variables are the leverage ratio (), measured as the market
value of the bonds divided by the market value of the ﬁrm, the leverage ratio squared (2),
and period (t). The formal equation is similar to (8), and the estimated equation turns
out as follows (see Table 4):
WACC = 1:5305 − 0:9702 ·  + 1:0941 · 2;
which oﬀers further support for the U-shaped cost of capital approach.
21
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 0216 Conclusions
When the leverage of a ﬁrm increases, the systematic risk of the ﬁrm’s equity increases
as well. Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that the higher return demanded by equity
holders exactly oﬀsets the lower market value of the bonds and, as a result, the weighted
average cost of capital remains the same. This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to investigate
the Modigliani-Miller theorem in laboratory markets where agents can trade shares of
ﬁrms generating the same income stream via diﬀerent capital structures. The design
includes some features intended to give the theorem its “best shot” at organizing the
data. Furthermore, as the theorem is based on individual utility maximization, we also
performed a control individual decision-making experiment where we elicited several points
on the individual supply and demand curves for shares.
The results identify some strengths and some weaknesses of Modigliani and Miller’s ap-
proach. On the one hand, subjects recognize the increased systematic risk of equity when
leverage increases, and thus demand a higher return for bearing this risk. On the other
hand, the regression results are supportive of a U-shaped cost of capital curve, suggesting
that subjects tend to underestimate the riskiness of low-leveraged equity and to overesti-
mate the riskiness of high-leveraged equity.
We do not regard our results as a rejection of the MM theorem. First, its main proposition
does a good job of organizing the data in the control experiment. Second, some of its
hypotheses cannot be rejected in the market experiment as well. The lack of full support for
the theorem may be due to market “imperfections”, deﬁned as anything that interferes with
trade, therefore causing a rational market participant either to deviate from holding the
market portfolio or to depart from his preferred risk level (see, e.g., DeGennaro, 2005). For
instance, the use of a single call market and the exclusion of arbitrage opportunities could
have aﬀected our ﬁndings. Understanding whether these design choices are important or
the violation of the theorem is genuine in nature may provide a fruitful avenue for future
research.
22
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 021References
Arzac, E. R. and Glosten, L. R. (2005). A reconsideration of tax shield valuation. European
Financial Management, 11:453–461.
Becker, G. M., DeGroot, M. H., and Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by a single-
response sequential method. Behavioral Science, 9:226–232.
Cason, T. N. and Friedman, D. (1997). Price formation in single call markets. Economet-
rica, 65(2):311–345.
Cason, T. N. and Friedman, D. (2008). A comparison of market institutions. In Plott,
C. R. and Smith, V. L., editors, Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, pages
264–272. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Chu, Y.-P. and Chu, R.-L. (1990). The subsidence of preference reversals in simpliﬁed and
marketlike experimental settings: A note. American Economic Review, 80(4):902–911.
Dann, L. Y. (1981). Common stock repurchases: An analysis of returns to bondholders
and stockholders. Journal of Financial Economics, 9(2):113–138.
Davenport, M. (1971). Leverage and the cost of capital: Some tests using British data.
Economica, 38(150):136–162.
DeGennaro, R. P. (2005). Market imperfections. Working Paper series 2005-12, Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Dell’Ariccia, G. and Marquez, R. (2010). Risk and the corporate structure of banks.
Journal of Finance, 65(3):1075–1096.
Economides, N. and Schwartz, R. A. (1995). Electronic call market trading. Journal of
Portfolio Management, 21:10–18.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments. Experimental
Economics, 10(2):171–178.
Graham, J. R. and Harvey, C. R. (2001). The theory and practice of corporate ﬁnance:
Evidence from the ﬁeld. Journal of Financial Economics, 60:187–243.
Harrison, G. and Rutstr¨ om, E. (2008). Risk aversion in the laboratory. In Cox, J. and
Harrison, G., editors, Research in Experimental Economics vol. 12. Risk Aversion in
Experiments, pages 41–196. UK: Emerald.
Hirshleifer, J. (1966). Investment decision under uncertainty: Application of the state
preference approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80(2):252–277.
23
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 021Holt, C. A. and Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive eﬀects in lottery choices.
American Economic Review, 92:1644–1655.
Kagel, J. H. (2004). Double auction markets with stochastic supply and demand schedules:
Call markets and continuous auction trading mechanisms. In Huck, S., editor, Advances
in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments, and Bounded Ra-
tionality. Essays in Honour of Werner G¨ uth, pages 181–208. NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Levy, H. and Levy, M. (2002). Experimental test of the prospect theory value function:
A stochastic dominance approach. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Pro-
cesses, 89:1058–1081.
Masulis, R. W. (1980). The eﬀects of capital structure change on security prices: A study
of exchange oﬀers. Journal of Financial Economics, 8(2):139–178.
Masulis, R. W. and Korwar, A. N. (1986). Seasoned equity oﬀerings: An empirical inves-
tigation. Journal of Financial Economics, 15(1/2):91–118.
Miller, M. H. and Modigliani, F. (1966). Some estimates of the cost of the capital to the
electric utility industry, 1954-57. American Economic Review, 56:333–391.
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation ﬁnance and the
theory of investment. American Economic Review, 48(3):261–297.
Myers, S. C. (2001). Capital structure. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2):81–102.
Pinegar, J. M. and Lease, R. C. (1986). The impact of preferred-for-common exchange
oﬀers on ﬁrm value. Journal of Finance, 41(4):795–814.
Quiggin, J. (1982). A theory of anticipated utility. Journal of Economic Behavior Orga-
nization, 3:323–343.
Robichek, A. A., McDonald, J. G., and Higgins, R. C. (1967). Some estimates of the cost
of capital to electric utility industry, 1954-57: Comment. American Economic Review,
57:1278–1288.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1997). The limits of arbitrage. Journal of Finance,
52:35–55.
Shogren, J. F. and Taylor, L. O. (2008). On behavioral-environmental economics. Review
of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2:26–44.
Smith, V. L., Williams, A. W., Bratton, W. K., and Vannoni, M. G. (1982). Competitive
market institutions: Double auctions vs. sealed bid-oﬀer auctions. American Economic
Review, 72(1):58–77.
24
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 021Stiglitz, J. E. (1969). A re-examination of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. American
Economic Review, 59(5):784–93.
Viscusi, W. K. (1989). Prospective reference theory: Toward an explanation of the para-
doxes. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2(3):235–264.
Weston, J. F. (1963). A test of capital propositions. Southern Economic Journal, 30:105–
112.
25
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 021Appendix A: Algorithm to compute the market clearing price
in the call auction
The following algorithm was used to calculate the market clearing price:
1. Any order for buying Q units at price Pb is transformed into a vector where Pb is
repeated Q times, so that each element of this vector can then be treated as a single
buy order at price Pb. The individual vectors are then combined into a general buy
vector, which is sorted by buying price in descending order (from highest to lowest).
A similar operation is done for all sell orders except that the resulting vector is sorted
by selling price from lowest to highest. In this way, aggregate demand and supply
schedules are constructed:
The buy vector (P1
b ; P2




The sell vector (P1
s ; P1









2. These two vectors are then pairwise compared (Pi
b and Pi
s), and this searching process
continues until a ﬁrst pair i where Pi
b < Pi
s is found. Obviously, a market clearing
price should satisfy
Pi
b < P < Pi
s;
since these two orders should not be executed. Meanwhile, Pi−1
b and Pi−1
s should
be exchangeable at the market clearing price, which implies
Pi−1
s < P < Pi−1
b :
Combining these two conditions, the market clearing price should satisfy
max{Pi−1
s ;Pi
b} < P∗ < min{Pi−1
b ;Pi
s}: (9)







3. If there is an excess demand or supply at this market clearing price, only the mini-
mum quantity of the buy or sell orders is randomly selected for execution.





s . In this case, P1
s − 0:01 is chosen to be the market clearing price if
P1
b < P1
s , and Pend




Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 021S1 Instructions for the market experiment (originally in Ger-
man)
Welcome to this experiment. Please cease any communication with other participants,
switch o your mobiles, and read these instructions carefully. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to you and answer your question in-
dividually. It is very important that you obey these rules, since we would otherwise be
forced to exclude you from the experiment and all related payments.
In the experiment you will earn money according to your own decisions, those of other
participants, and random events. The show up fee of e2.50 will be taken into account in
your payment. In the experiment, we shall speak of ECU (Experimental Currency Units)
rather than Euro. The total amount of ECU you earn will be converted into Euro at the
end of the experiment. The conversion rate is 10 ECU = 1 Euro.
Please note that it is possible to make a loss in this experiment. If this happens, you would
have to come to the Max Planck Institute and do some oce work. By this, you will be
paid at e7 per hour. However, this can only be used to repay your losses (not to increase
your earnings).
The experiment will consist of 2 phases. The following instructions only refer to the rst
phase. Instructions for the second phase will be given to you after the rst phase is nished.
Both phases of the experiment will be paid, and your performance in the rst phase does
not in
uence your payment in second phase.
DETAILED INFORMATION FOR THE FIRST PHASE
For ten dierent situations, you have to choose one of two options X or Y . These 10
dierent situations will be presented on screen. Option Y pays out 50 ECU with certainty.
Option X yields 2 possible monetary outcomes, 70 ECU and 30 ECU that are paid out
according to the probabilities noted. While the two possible outcomes remain constant in
all 10 situations, their probabilities vary. Options X and Y will be presented as shown in
Table 1.
For instance, in situation 1 of the table, option X yields 70 ECU with probability 1=10 and
30 ECU with probability 9=10. Option Y yields 50 ECU with certainty.
On the right hand side, you have to click the option you choose. For option X click the
left circle, and for option Y the right circle. Please note that at the end of the experiment
(after phase 2), only one of these 10 situations will be randomly selected to be paid out.
All situations are equally likely, i.e., the computer picks a random number from 1 to 10
1
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Option X Option Y
1 with 1=10 a gain of 70 ECU, with 9=10 a gain of 30 ECU a sure gain of 50 ECU X 
 
Y
2 with 2=10 a gain of 70 ECU, with 8=10 a gain of 30 ECU a sure gain of 50 ECU X 
 
Y
3 with 3=10 a gain of 70 ECU, with 7=10 a gain of 30 ECU a sure gain of 50 ECU X 
 
Y
4 with 4=10 a gain of 70 ECU, with 6=10 a gain of 30 ECU a sure gain of 50 ECU X 
 
Y
5 with 5=10 a gain of 70 ECU, with 5=10 a gain of 30 ECU a sure gain of 50 ECU X 
 
Y
6 with 6=10 a gain of 70 ECU, with 4=10 a gain of 30 ECU a sure gain of 50 ECU X 
 
Y
7 with 7=10 a gain of 70 ECU, with 3=10 a gain of 30 ECU a sure gain of 50 ECU X 
 
Y
8 with 8=10 a gain of 70 ECU, with 2=10 a gain of 30 ECU a sure gain of 50 ECU X 
 
Y
9 with 9=10 a gain of 70 ECU, with 1=10 a gain of 30 ECU a sure gain of 50 ECU X 
 
Y
10 a sure gain of 70 ECU a sure gain of 50 ECU X 
 
Y
Table 1: Presentation of the options
and thereby determines the situation that will be paid out. If in the randomly selected
situation you pick Y , then you get 50 ECU for sure. Otherwise, to determine your payment,
a second random number Z in the range of 0 to 10 (with 2 decimals) is generated. For
the case described above, where probabilities for option X are 1=10 and 9=10, the outcome
is determined as follows. If the random number Z falls between 0 and 1 (0  Z  1),
i.e., with probability 1=10, option X yields 70 ECU. If the random number Z falls between
1 and 10 (1 < Z  10), i.e., with probability 9=10, the option yields 30 ECU.
DETAILED INFORMATION FOR THE SECOND PHASE
In this phase there are 32 participants, divided into 4 groups with 8 participants each.
You belong to one of these 4 groups, and you will play with the same 7 other participants
repeatedly in this phase. The identities of the 7 participants you play with will not be
revealed to you at any time.
This phase consists of 6 rounds. At the beginning of each round, we will grant you a
interest free credit bundle, which is composed of Mini amount of ECU and Nini units of
risky alternative R. The Mini ECU will be automatically deposited into a bank which pays
you 1.5 times the deposited amount for sure. Each unit of risky alternative R allows you
to gain:
. a high amount H of ECU with 50% probability;
. a low amount L of ECU with 50% probability.
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beginning of each round.
You can trade risky alternatives with the 7 other participants in your group. The ECU
needed for buying risky alternative R will be deducted from the ECU you have in the
bank. The ECU you get from selling risky alternative R will be automatically deposited
into the bank.
The trading in each round lasts 3 minutes. It operates as follows.
1. You must state a) whether you want to buy or sell units of risky alternative R, b)
how many units you want to buy or sell, and c) the price per unit. The request takes
the following form:
I want to buy (or sell) units of risky alternative R at price per unit.
You will not see the requests made by the other 7 group members.
2. After one minute, all requests of your group will be aggregated, and a suggestive
price P will be published to each member of your group. This price is chosen to
maximize the exchanged units of risky alternative R. The suggestive price P is
not the actual trading price; it only indicates that if the current requests are not
changed until the end of the 3 minutes, then the requests satisfying the following
three conditions will be executed at the suggestive price P
Trading Condition 1: all buy requests with price higher than P;
Trading Condition 2: all sell requests with price lower than P;
Trading Condition 3: for sell or buy requests at the suggestive price, only the
minimum of the two will be traded. That is, if demands are larger than supplies,
these sell requests will be randomly allocated to buy requests; if supplies are larger
than demands, these buy requests will be randomly allocated to sell requests.
Suppose, for example, that the suggestive price is P = 9, and you requested to buy
5 units of risky alternative R at the price of 17 ECU per unit. Since 17  9 (Trading
Condition 1), these requests will be executed at P = 9 (not at 17). If, instead, you
requested to buy 5 units of R at the price of 8 ECU per unit, this request will not
be executed because 8 < 9. If you requested to buy 10 units of R at P = 9 , but
there are only 5 sell units at 9, then you will only get 5 units.
3. After knowing the suggestive price, you can change your requests within the next
one minute.
4. At the end of the second minute, all requests will be once again aggregated to give
a new suggestive price, and you can adjust your requests in the next 1 minute.
5. At the end of 3 minutes, the trading ceases and a unique actual trading price P is
published, which is the same for all the 8 participants in the your group. All requests
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2 above are executed.
The ECU you have in the bank after the trading (Mend) will be multiplied by 1.5. De-
pending on your trading activities, this amount can also be negative. The units of risky
alternative R you have after the trading Nend allows you to obtain:
 Nend  H ECU with 50% probability;
 Nend  L ECU with 50% probability.
However, the credit you have taken has to be paid back fully, i.e., you will have to pay
back Mini and Nini units of risky alternative R. The remaining ECU will be your round
net prot (which can also be negative).
Suppose that we grant you Mini ECU and Nini units of risky alternative R, and after
the trading you have Mend ECU in the bank and Nend units of the risky alternative. If
the price of a unit of risky alternative R at the end of the trading is P, and the risky
alternative R obtains H, then:
 the value of your initial bundle (Mini ECU and Nini units of risky alternative R) is
Mini + Nini  P;
 the value of your nal bundle (Mend ECU and Nend units of risky alternative R) is
1:5Mend + Nend  P + Nend  H.
Your round earnings is calculated as follows:
Round earnings = the value of your nal bundle   the value of your initial bundle
= 1:5Mend + Nend  P + Nend  H   Mini   Nini  P
The information you receive
At the end of each round, you will receive information about 1) the actual trading price
P, and 2) your nal holdings of ECU (Mend) and units of risky alternative R (Nend).
At the end of this phase, you will receive information about 1) the outcome that risky
alternative R obtains in each round, 2) your net prot in each round, 3) the round chosen
for payment, and 4) your nal experimental earnings.
Your experimental earnings in this phase
At the end of this phase, only one round will be randomly chosen for payment. The
resulting amount will be converted to euros and paid out in cash.
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In order to get acquainted with the structure of the experiment, you will have two training
rounds before the real experiment starts. These two rounds will not be chosen for payment.
Before the experiment starts, you will have to answer some control questions to ensure
your understanding of the experiment.
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Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment funded by the Max Planck Insti-
tute of Economics. Please switch o your mobiles and remain silent. It is strictly forbidden
to talk to other participants. Please raise your hand whenever you have a question; one of
the experimenters will come to your aid.
You will receive e2.50 for showing up on time. Besides this, you can earn more. But there
is also a small possibility of ending up with a loss. The show-up fee and any additional
amounts of money you may earn will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Payments are carried out privately, i.e., the others will not see your earnings.
Throughout the experiment, we shall speak of ECU (Experimental Currency Units) rather
than Euro. The conversion rate is 10 ECU = 1 Euro.
You will not interact with any other participant. Your earnings during the experiment will
depend on your own decisions and on chance. Think carefully and make your decisions at
the pace you feel comfortable with. There are no right or wrong decisions.
The experiment consists of 8 rounds. You will be facing the same decision situation in
each round.
The situation you will face in each round
At the beginning of each round you will be endowed with Mini ECU and Nini units of a
risky alternative. The value of Mini will vary from round to round. The value of Nini can
be either 12 or 13. You will be told your initial endowment Mini of ECU and whether you
own 12 or 13 units of the risky alternative at the beginning of each round.
The Mini ECU in your possession will be automatically deposited in a bank which
pays you 1.5 times the deposited amount for sure at the end of the round. Thus, if you
have 100 ECU in the bank, you get 1001:5 = 150 ECU at the end of the round. Similarly,
if you have 50 ECU in the bank, you get 50  1:5 = 75 ECU.
Each unit of the risky alternative allows you to gain
. a high amount H of ECU with 50% probability;
. a low amount L of ECU with 50% probability.
Suppose that H = 10 and L = 5. Then each unit of the risky alternative allows you to
gain 10 ECU with 50% probability and 5 ECU with 50% probability. If you own 12 units
of this risky alternative, you have either 120 ECU with 50% probability or 60 ECU with
50% probability. The amounts H and L will vary from round to round and will be revealed
to you at the beginning of each round. The risky alternative will be always presented in
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What you have to do
In each round you will be asked to buy further B units of the risky alternative you
confront in that round, and to sell S units of it. There will be four buy decisions and four
sell decisions. These eight decisions will dier in the units of the risky alternative you must
buy (B) and the units of the risky alternative you must sell (S). The values of B and S
will be displayed on your computer screen at the time of your decisions.
 Buy decisions
For the buy decisions, you must report the highest amount of ECU for which you would
be willing to buy each of the B units of the round's risky alternative. In other words, you





You must buy B units of the above risky alternative.
What is the maximum price are you willing to pay for each unit?
The ECU needed for buying the predetermined B units of the risky alternative will be
deducted from the Mini ECU you have in the bank.
If you need more than Mini ECU for carrying out a buy decision, you can borrow these
extra ECU from the bank at a gross interest rate of 1.5. Suppose, for instance, that
Mini = 50 ECU, but you need 120 ECU for buying the B units specied by the buy
decision. You can borrow 70 (= 120 50) ECU from the bank and then pay 105 (= 701:5)
ECU back at the end of the round.
 Sell decisions
For the sell decisions, you must report the lowest amount of ECU for which you would
be willing to sell each of the S units of the round's risky alternative. In other words, you
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You must sell S units of the above risky alternative.
What is your minimum selling price for each unit?
The ECU you get from selling the predetermined S units of the risky alternative will be
automatically deposited in the bank and earn an gross interest rate of 1:5.
For each of your eight decisions, irrespective of whether they are buy or sell decisions, you
must state an amount between 0.50 and 12.00 ECU (up to two digits after the decimal).
Your round payo
Your payo in each round will depend on your decisions and on two random choices made
by the computer. More specically, your round payo is determined as follows.
After you have made all your eight decisions, the computer will randomly select one of
your decisions as the \relevant decision".
If the relevant decision is a buy decision, the computer will randomly choose a number
between 0.50 and 12.00 (with two digits after the decimal). You can think of this number
as the price at which the experimenters would sell each unit of the risky alternative.
  If this random number (i.e., the price at which the experimenters would sell each
unit of the risky alternative) is greater than the maximum amount of ECU you were
willing to pay for each unit, you do not buy any units of the risky alternative.
  If this random number is smaller than or equal to the maximum amount of ECU
you were willing to pay for each unit, you buy the B units specied in the relevant
decision, and pay for each unit an amount of ECU equal to the random number
(i.e., equal to the price at which the experimenters would sell each unit; not to the
amount you stated!). So, if we refer to this random number as pB, you pay pB  B.
If the relevant decision is a sell decision, the computer will again randomly choose a num-
ber between 0.50 and 12.00 (with two digits after the decimal). Now you can think of
this number as the price at which the experimenters would buy each unit of the risky
alternative.
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unit of the risky alternative) is smaller than the minimum amount of ECU you asked
for each unit, you do not sell any units of the risky alternative.
  If this random number is greater than or equal to the minimum amount of ECU
you asked for each unit, you sell the S units specied in the relevant decision, and
collect for each unit an amount of ECU equal to the random number (i.e., equal to
the price at which the experimenters would buy each unit; not to the amount you
stated!). So, if we refer to this random number as pS, you collect pS  S.
With this mechanism it is in your best interest to state the \true" amount of ECU for
which you would be willing to buy or to sell each unit of the risky alternative under
consideration. Not reporting your true willingness to pay (in the buy decisions) and your
true willingness to ask (in the sell decisions) will not help you.
The ECU you have in the bank at the end of the round (Mend) will be multiplied by 1.5.
The resulting amount will be paid to you if it is positive, and will be paid by you if it is
negative. Mend diers from Mini (your initial endowment of ECU) only if you carry out a
transaction, i.e., if you buy the B units specied by a relevant \buy" decision or you sell
the S units specied by a relevant \sell" decision.
The units of the risky alternative you have at the end (Nend) allow you to gain
 Nend  H ECU with 50% probability;
 Nend  L ECU with 50% probability.
Nend diers from Nini (your initial units of the risky alternative) only if you carry out a
transaction.
To sum up, the following outcomes are possible.
  The relevant buy or sell decision does not result in any transaction. In this case,
Mend = Mini and Nend = Nini. Therefore




Mini  1:5 + Nini  H with 50% probability;
Mini  1:5 + Nini  L with 50% probability:
  The relevant decision is a buy decision and you buy the B units of the risky alter-
native at a price equal to the random number pB. In this case, Mend = Mini   pBB
and Nend = Nini + B. Therefore




(Mini   pBB)  1:5 + (Nini + B)  H with 50% probability;
(Mini   pBB)  1:5 + (Nini + B)  L with 50% probability:
  The relevant decision is a sell decision and you sell the S units of the risky alternative
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Nend = Nini   S. Therefore




(Mini + psS)  1:5 + (Nini   S)  H with 50% probability;
(Mini + psS)  1:5 + (Nini   S)  L with 50% probability:
At the end of each round, the computer will determine whether each unit of the risky
alternative pays H or L ECU out.
The following examples should help you better understand the calculation of your round
payo.
Example 1
Suppose that you are endowed with Mini = 10 ECU and Nini = 12 units of a risky
alternative, each unit of which allows you to gain either 8 or 4 ECU with 50% probability
each. Suppose also that the randomly selected relevant decision is a buy decision in which
you are asked to buy B = 4 units of the above risky alternative. Suppose nally that you
report a maximum buying price of 6.45 ECU, and that the outcome of the risky alternative
is 8 ECU.
 If the random number chosen by the computer is pB = 7, you do not buy any units
of the risky alternative (because 7 > 6:45). This implies that you have (i) 10 ECU
in the bank, from which you obtain (10  1:5) = 15 ECU; (ii) 12 units of the risky
alternative, from which you gain (12  8) = 96 ECU. Your round payo is therefore
15 + 96 = 111 ECU.
 If the random number chosen by the computer is pB = 5:75, you buy the 4 units
of the risky alternative (because 5:75 < 6:45) at the price of 5:75. This implies
that you now have: (i) 10   (5:75  4) =  13 ECU in the bank, i.e. you must pay
 13  1:5 =  19:5 ECU; (ii) 12 + 4 = 16 units of the risky alternative, from which
you gain (16  8) = 128 ECU. Your round payo is therefore  19:5 + 128 = 108:5
ECU.
Example 2
Suppose that you are endowed with Mini = 20 ECU and Nini = 12 units of a risky
alternative, each unit of which allows you to gain either 10 or 5 ECU with 50% probability
each. Suppose now that the randomly selected relevant decision is a sell decision in which
you are asked to sell S = 2 units of the above risky alternative. Suppose nally that you
report a minimum selling price of 5.25 ECU, and that the outcome of the risky alternative
is 5 ECU.
 If the random number chosen by the computer is pS = 8:50, you sell the 2 units
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(8:50  2) = 37 ECU in the bank, from which you obtain 37  1:5 = 55:5 ECU;
(ii) 12   2 = 10 units of the risky alternative, from which you gain (10  5) = 50
ECU. Your round payo is therefore 55:5 + 50 = 105:5 ECU.
The information you receive at the end of each round
At the end of each period, you will receive information about 1) the decision chosen by
the computer as the relevant decision, 2) the random number selected by the computer,
3) whether or not you carry out the transaction corresponding to the relevant decision,
4) the outcome of the risky alternative, and 5) your corresponding round payo.
Your nal payo
At the end of the experiment, one experimenter will randomly select one participant by
drawing a ball from an urn that contains as many balls as the number of participants.
This participant will in his turn randomly select one of the eight rounds of the experiment
by drawing a ball from an urn containing eight balls numbered 1 to 8. This round payo
will be converted to euros (at the exchange rate of 10 ECU = 1 Euro) and paid out in
cash.
In case of a negative payo, losses up to e2.50 (= 25 ECUs) will be covered by your
show-up fee. There are two alternatives concerning losses in excess of e2.50. The rst
is to pay the dierence from your own money. The second is to pay the dierence by
performing (before leaving the lab) a task which consists of counting the occurrences of
a specic letter in a lengthy text. You will be compensated with e1.00 for each correctly
counted sentence. The drill is introduced to allow you to repay your losses; there is no way
of earning extra money from it.
Before starting you will have to answer some control questions which will ensure your
understanding of the rules of the experiment. Once everybody has answered all questions
correctly, two practice rounds will help you familiarize yourself with the dynamics of the
experiment. The result of these rounds will not be relevant to your nal payo.
Please remain quietly seated during the whole experiment. If you have any questions, please
raise your hand now. Please click \ok" on your computer screen when you have nished
reading the instructions of this part of the experiment.
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